Federalism and Federal Regulation of Public Employers: The Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery by Drane, W. Harding
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1977
Federalism and Federal Regulation of Public
Employers: The Implications of National League of
Cities v. Usery
W. Harding Drane
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the State
and Local Government Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland
State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, Federalism and Federal Regulation of Public Employers: The Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 259 (1977)
NOTES
FEDERALISM AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF
PUBLIC EMPLOYERS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v. USERY
O NE OF THE GREAT CHALLENGES in the drafting of the Constitution was
the attempt to create a stronger central government than the one exist-
ing under the Articles of the Confederation, and at the same time to pre-
serve the identity and sovereignty of the states.' The response to this
challenge was the creation of a national government of specific, delegated
powers, and the reservation of all non-delegated powers to the states and
to the people unless specifically prohibited by the Constitution.2 Though
the allocation of powers in the Constitution between the federal and state
governments is perhaps the distinctive characteristic of our system, "fas-
cinating"3 and difficult4 problems of analysis are created where the ill-
defined outer reaches of national power intrude deeply into the realm of
state sovereignty. The purpose of this Note is to examine the limits of
the federal commerce power5 when applied to the states as states, using
as a focal point, the controversies which have arisen in the application of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) 6.
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
At least four key Supreme Court decisions concerning state sover-
eignty and the reach of the commerce power have been rendered in cases
involving the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. In the most recent of
these cases, National League of Cities v. Usery,8 the Court held that the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA9 could not be ap-
WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 146-51 (1937).
2 GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 81 (9th ed. 1975). The
most notable delegation of powers to the national government in the Constitution is in sec-
tion 8 of article I. Non-delegated powers are reserved to the states by the tenth amend-
ment, which provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited to it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U. S. CONsT. amend. X.
Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Sepa-
ration of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 682
(1976).
See BLACK, PERSPEcrIVES IN CONSTIrtrrIONAL LAw 41 (1963).
5 The commerce clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States .. " U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, (current version at 29 U.S.C.
5§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. V. 1975)). The FLSA is the basic federal law governing wages,
hours and working conditions. See notes 24-31 infra and accompanying text.
7 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Employees v. Department
of Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); and
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
s See note 7 supra.
9 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1970 § Supp. V 1975).
259
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1977
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
plied to employees of state and local governments, invalidating a 1974
amendment to the Act which expressly provided for such application.' 0
The Court found that extension of these guidelines to public employees
would constitute an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power in
that federal regulation would "operate to directly displace the States'
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
mrental functions,"" contrary to "the federal system of government em-
bodied in the Constitution.'12
Immediately following the Supreme Court's decision in National
League, a number of public employers moved for summary dismissals in
suits brought by employeesl3 under the Equal Pay Act,1 4 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act,' 5 both of which Acts are related in
scope and intent to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Equal Pay Act of
1963, which prohibits discrimination in compensation on the basis of sex,
is contained in section 6 of the FLSA. The Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act contains similar provisions to protect older workers, and incor-
porates the enforcement mechanisms of the FLSA. All of these Acts are
codified in Title 29 of the United States Code, and each is based expressly
upon a congressional finding of burdens on interstate commerce.' Con-
gress extended coverage under all three Acts to employees of state and
local governments in 1974 by amending the FLSA definition of "em-
ployer" to include public agencies. 17  Nevertheless, most courts 8 that
have addressed the question have refused to hold that the Supreme
Court's decision in National League precludes application of the sex and
age discrimination provisions to public workers.
Both Circuits- that have addressed the issue on appeal have held that
10 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 54 (amend-
ing 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e), 203(r), 203(s), 203(x) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
" 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
12 Id.
13 For a listing of cases in which it was held that the Equal Pay Act and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act apply to public as well as private employers, see note 171
infra. For the two cases that reached the opposite conclusion, see note 20 infra.
14 Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970). The Act provides in part that
"[N]o employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discrimi-
nate . . . between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at
a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for
equal work." Id. § 206(d)(1).
I' This Act provides in part:
Sec. 4(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer -
(1) to fail or to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee because of such individual's age ....
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 603 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
6 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2(a)(4),
81 Stat. 602; Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 2(b), 77 Stat. 56; Fair Labor
Standards Act § 2(a), ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938).
17 See note 10 supra.
11 See note 171 infra and accompanying text.
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the Equal Pay Act is binding on state and local governments, and in one
of these cases the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 19 A third appeal is
now pending in the Sixth Circuit, however, in a case in which the district
court held that the Equal Pay Act may not be applied to public employees
in light of the National League decision.20 Furthermore, in those circuits
which have held the sex and age discrimination acts applicable to public
employees, there is disagreement whether the acts are supportable under
the commerce power, or only as valid exercises of the power granted by
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The implications of the Na-
tional League decision in these areas are as yet unresolved.
Similar difficulties appeared upon remand of the National League case
as the district court attempted to fashion a decree implementing the Su-
preme Court's opinion. 21 First, the district court followed the majority of
the lower courts which have considered the question in refusing to
rule that the Equal Pay Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
and the Portal-to-Portal Act 22 were inapplicable to state and local gov-
ernments as a result of National LeagueY3 The court also declined to
extend to all public employees the Supreme Court's invalidation of the
minimum wage and overtime provisions, pointing out that Mr. Justice
Rehnquist's opinion had referred only to "activities integral to and tradi-
tionally provided by government."2 4
As part of its final decree, therefore, the district court required the
Secretary of Labor henceforth to publish in the Federal Register and the
Code of Federal Regulations a listing of those non-traditional govern-
mental functions that will be required to comply with the minimum wage
and overtime standards of the FLSA.25
'9 Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 946 (1977); Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir.
1977).
20 Usery v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 423 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky.), appeal
filed, No. 77-3069 (6th Cir. Dec. 20, 1976). A conclusion similar to that in the Owens-
boro case was reached in Howard v. Ward County, 418 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.D. 1976). In
the latter case, however, the district court upheld the plaintiff's sex discrimination claim
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which provides essentially the same protections as
the Equal Pay Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For further
treatment of the relationship between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, see text at note 181
infra.
21 National League of Cities v. Marshall, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6933 (D.D.C. 1977) (per
curium), final decree entered sub nom., National League of Cities v. Usery, No. 74-1812
(D.D.C. 1977).
22 The Portal-to-Portal Pay Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 251-262 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). This Act was passed to counteract judicial interpreta-
tions of the Fair Labor Standards Act which had resulted in enormous windfall recoveries
for employees. It also serves to regulate suits under the FLSA, the Walsh-Healey Act, and
the Bacon Davis Act. See H.R. Ra. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1947]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1029.
23 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 6933, 6934.
24 Id. at 6935.
2'5 See National League of Cities v. Usery, No. 74-1812, slip op. at 1 (D.D.C. March 9,
1977). The regulations governing future enforcement of the minimum wage and overtime
provisions of the FLSA against state and local governments were included as an appendix
to the district court's opinion, and will be codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 775.2, .3. The regula-
1977]
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The lower courts have experienced notable difficulties in interpreting
the meaning of the National League opinion as it affects both the exten-
sion of sex and age discrimination guidelines to public employers, and
the continued application of the minimum wage and hour laws to non-
traditional public workers. These difficulties are not surprising, consid-
ering that the case invoked rarely-used limits on a major constitutionally-
delegated power. The case involved the delicate interrelationships be-
tween Congress and the Supreme Court,2 6 and between the national
government and the states, where the boundaries of power are often
unclear. The basic shortcoming of the Court's opinion in National
League was that it failed to articulate sufficiently its reasons for deter-
mining that Congress had overstepped the bounds of the commerce power
and intruded unconstitutionally upon the states. Furthermore, the Court
did not delineate the roles that Congress, the states, and the courts should
assume in the application of a meaningful test. The absence of these
elements in the Court's opinion is likely not only to create further con-
fusion in the lower courts, but more importantly to cause misunderstand-
ings regarding the allocation of power within the federal system.
II. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT PRIOR TO
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES V. USERY
A. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
The FLSA was based upon the congressional finding that unfair labor
practices by employers engaged in the production of goods for com-
merce causes unsatisfactory conditions to spread among the states, bur-
dens the free flow of goods, constitutes an unfair method of competition,
tions provide that the Secretary of Labor will not seek to enforce the wage and overtime
guidelines, except where the government body has received 30 days notice that the em-
ployees are not performing "integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions." 29 C.F.R. § 775.2(b). Such notice must be given either directly to the gov-
ernmental body, or published in the Federal Register in the list of non-traditional govern-
mental activities. The offending governmental unit will then be given the opportunity to
comply voluntarily with the minimum wage and overtime guidelines before suit is filed.
Any relief, moreover, will be prospective only when the suit involves any activity not
previously determined to be non-traditional by judicial decision or administrative ruling.
29 C.F.R. § 775.2(d). Also, liquidated or double damages will not be recoverable in cases
where there has not been a prior determination that the activity is non-traditional. Id.
The only activity listed in the regulations as non-traditional is the operation of a railroad
by a state or political subdivision. 29 C.F.R. § 775.3(a). This activity was specifically
found to be non-traditional in the Supreme Court's opinion. See National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 n. 18 (1976).
26 The importance of understanding the distinct roles of Congress and the Supreme
Court in handling issues concerning the scope of the national government's powers was
recently discussed in Tribe, supra note 3, at 695-97. In his article Professor Tribe argues
that, subject to the unclear constitutional limits of federalism contained in the tenth and
eleventh amendments, Congress has a "peculiar institutional competence" to allocate
power within the federal system. The gist of this argument is that the states are repre-
sented in Congress and therefore are able to protect their interests. Cf. National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 876-77 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see the
majority opinion in National League, 426 U.S. at 841 n. 12. See generally Cohen, Con-
gressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603
(1975); Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie - The Thread, 87 HAnv. L. REV. 1682
(1974); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
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leads to labor disputes, and interferes with marketing. 27  By its terms,
the Act was an express exercise of Congress' power to regulate com-
merce.2 1  Major provisions of the Act establish minimum wages, 29 re-
quired premium pay for overtime, 30 outlawed the use of oppressive child
labor, 31 and require records to be kept.3 2  Employers who violate the
wage and hour provisions of the Act are liable to the employees affected
for double the amount of wages or overtime not properly paid, and are
subject to possible criminal liability.33 Enforcement actions may be
brought by the employee, by his representative such as a union, or by the
Secretary of Labor.34
B. Federalism Challenges to the FLSA
1. United States v. Darby
The Act originally applied only to employees actually engaged in com-
merce or in the production of goods for commerce. 35 The FLSA was de-
clared constitutional in United States v. Darby,36 which concerned the
application of the Act to employees of a manufacturing firm which
shipped goods to other states. The Supreme Court held that although
manufacturing itself is not interstate commerce, the means adopted by
Congress, regulating the local production of goods for commerce, were
appropriate to the end of regulating interstate commerce itself. The
Court also rejected the argument that the tenth amendment is a barrier
to the legitimate exercise of the commerce power over "local" activities,
commenting that "the amendment states but a truism that all is retained
which is not surrendered. '" 37
2. The 1961 and 1966 Amendments, and Maryland v. Wirtz
The FLSA was amended in "1961 to extend coverage to employees
employed in "enterprises" engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce.38  The practical effect of this amendment was to
27 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
28 29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (1970).
- 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
30 id. 9 207.
31 Id. § 212.
32 29 U.S.C. § 211 (1970).
33 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(a), 216(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
34 29 U.S.C. 99 216(b), 216(c) (1970 & V 1975). Prior to the 1974 amendments, ac-
tions were brought by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Depart-
ment of Labor rather than by the Secretary of Labor. See Fair labor Standards Amend-
ments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 26, 88 Stat. 54 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970)).
35 E.g. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, §§ 6(a), 7(a), 52 Stat. 1060
(amended 1974).
36 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941).
37 Id. at 124. The Court overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) which
held that manufacturing was a matter of state or local concern, and that the tenth amend-
ment precluded national regulation thereof. 312 U.S. 100, 115-17 (1941).
31 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 2 (c), 75 Stat. 65
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(r), 203(s)).
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include all the co-workers of previously-covered employees without en-
larging the number of covered employers. The Act was amended again
in 1966 to include non-teaching public school employees, and employees
of public hospitals, institutions, and transit systems.39 This was the
first time that any public employees had been covered by the Act.
In Maryland v. Wirtz the State of Maryland sued the Secretary of La-
bor to enjoin enforcement of the 1961 and 1966 amendments, arguing
that both the enterprise concept and the extension of the Act to public
employees were beyond the scope of the commerce power and therefore
unconstitutional. Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court rejected both
arguments, and the enterprise concept was upheld on three distinct
grounds. First, a rational basis was found for Congress' finding that
commerce is affected by the wages baid to coworkers of employees en-
gaged in producing goods for commerce. 41 This was based upon the idea
that a business paying substandard wages, even though only to employees
not engaged directly in commerce or production for commerce, could
compete unfairly with employers not paying substandard wages and
thereby impede Congress' purpose. Second, the Court found a rational
basis for the enterprise concept as a method of preventing labor unrest
which could spread to employees actually engaged in commerce or pro-
duction, thereby disrupting commerce.42 Third, the Court found that an
enterprise could be covered even if only a few of its employees were
engaged in commerce or production, despite the argument that this
would allow "the tail to wag the dog."4a It was reasoned that Congress
has the power to declare that an entire class of activities affects com-
merce, and while the Court may scrutinize the basis of Congress' finding,
it should not exclude individual members of the class." Otherwise it
would be impossible to reach a type of activity substantially impeding
commerce when the activity is carried out by a large number of individu-
als or businesses, many of which impede commerce only slightly.
The second and more important question addressed in Wirtz was
3' Employees of private schools, hospitals, institutions and transit systems had been
covered previously. Fair Labor Standard Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102,
80 Stat. 830 (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(r), 203(s)).
40 392 U.s. 183 (1968).
41 Id. at 190. The Court cited Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964)
irn support of the proposition that the Court itself need only find that Congress had a ra-
tional basis for creating the regulatory scheme.
42 392 U.S. at 191-92.
43 Id. at 192.
44 The Court relied here on United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), and on
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Darby upheld application of the FLSA to a
class of intrastate activities - production of goods for commerce - as an appropriate means
of regulating interstate commerce. 312 U.S. at 121. In Wickard the Court rejected
the argument of an Ohio farmer that the Agricultural Adjustment Act could not constitu-
tionally be applied to regulate wheat grown for home consumption. Justice Jackson's
opinion stated that while the wheat grown by one individual would admittedly have a
trivial impact on the national market price, that wheat together with the wheat of all the
other farmers similarly situated would have a substantial impact. Therefore, to allow
the plaintiff to be exempt from the Act would defeat the legitimate scheme of Congress
to control interstate commodity prices. 317 U.S. at 127-29.
(Vol. 26:259
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whether employees in public institutions could be included within the
coverage of the FLSA. Justice Harlan first established that schools and
state institutions have a substantial impact on interstate commerce
through their purchases of millions of dollars of goods and equipment
from out of state.4 Strikes by public employees under these circum-
stances would clearly impede the flow of goods across state lines.
The opinion then proceeded to dismiss the appellants' argument that
Congress was interfering with sovereign governmental functions of the
states. Relying upon the case of United States v. California,46 in which
the Safety Applicance Act47 had been upheld in its application to a state-
run railroad, the Court in Wirtz found no basis for distinguishing be-
tween activities carried on by the states. and similar activities carried
on by private interests. Assuming of course that there is a sufficient
nexus to the power to regulate commerce, state activities as well as pri-
vate ones may be regulated:
[W]hile the commerce power has limits, valid general regula-
tions of commerce do not cease to be regulations of commerce
because a State is involved. If a State is engaging in economic
activities that are validly regulated by the Federal Government
when engaged in by private persons, the State too may be forced
to conform its activities to federal regulation.8
Going further perhaps than the facts of the case required, Justice
Harlan then stated that neither the "governmental" nor the "proprie-
tary" functions of a state are immune from the valid exercise of a dele-
gated power. Moreover, he denied that there was any basis for the
appellants' contention that there was a constitutional doctrine implying
that the national and state governments may not "interfere with the free
and full exercise of the powers of the other. '" 49
The far-reaching implications of Harlan's view of the breadth of na-
tional powers to regulate the states' governmental functions drew a
strong dissent from Justice Douglas. The thrust of his dissent was that
the 1966 amendments to the FLSA were an intrusion on state fiscal
4-1392 U.S. at 194.
46297 U.S. 175 (1936).
47 Safety Appliance Act, ch. 196, § 6, 27 Stat. 531 (1893), as amended by Act of April,
1, 1896, ch. 87, 29 Stat. 85 (1896).
48 392 U.S. at 196-197.
49 Id. at 195. Justice Harlan was quoting here from the opinion of the Court in Case v.
Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946). In Bowles the Court held that thfe sale of timber by the
State of Washington to raise money for the support of the public schools was subject
to the Emergency Price Control Act despite a provision of the congressional enabling act
providing for the admission of Washington to the union which stipulated that the timber
could not be sold for less than ten dollars per acre. (The timber was grown on lands
granted to Washington by the federal government at the time of its admission.) The
enabling act provision had in turn been incorporated into the state constitution. The
ceiling price for such sales under regulations issued pursuant to the Emergency Price
Control Act was lower than the minimum allowed by the enabling act and the state con-
stitution. See further discussion of Case v. Bowles in text accompanying notes 152-57
infra.
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policy and therefore impermissible under the tenth amendment.5 °
While the dissent admitted that the states were not altogether immune
from regulation under the commerce power, it posited a distinction "be-
tween the state as government and the state as trader."5' There was no
objection to regulating trade activities such as the sale by a state of min-
eral water,52 but Douglas saw no reason to assume from the majority
opinion that Congress, aided by the enterprise concept, could not take
over virtually all state governmental activities involving expenditures
of money, including drawing up each state's budget.53 This would give
Congress free rein to "devour the essentials of state sovereignty," con-
trary to what the dissent viewed as the protection of that sovereignty
under the tenth amendment.5 While only Justice Stewart joined Doug-
las in his dissent, the position argued is essentially that propounded
by the majority eight years later in National League of Cities v. Usery.
3. Enforcement of the 1966 Amendments:
The Eleventh Amendment
The majority opinion in Wirtz, while upholding generally the exten-
sion of the FLSA to the public employees enumerated in the 1966
amendments, expressly reserved the question whether an employee de-
nied the rights protected by the Act could sue his employer.5 This
question was presented squarely in Employees v. Department of Public
Welfare of the State of Missouri.5 7 The district court had dismissed a
suit by state employees alleging violations of the overtime provisions of
the Act on the grounds that the state had not consented to the suit, and
that the action was therefore barred by the eleventh amendment.5
The court of appeals affirmed en banc.5s
50 392 U.S. at 201-03.
51 Id. at 205 (quoting New York v. United States,326 U.S. 572, 579 (1946)) (opinion of
Franfurter, J.).
52 See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
5 392 U.S. at 204-05.
54 Id. at 205.
5 The majority consisted of Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black, Brennan,
White, and Fortas, in addition to Justice Harlan. Justice Marshall did not participate
in the decision.
50 This question was not reached in Wirtz because that case was an action for an in-
junction against enforcement of the 1966 amendments, and for a declaratory judgment to
the effect that the amendments were unconstitutional. The plaintiffs attempted also to
raise the question of the states' amenability to suit in federal court in light of the eleventh
amendment, but the three judge court below ruled that the question should await an ac-
tual suit by an employee. 269 F. Supp. 826, 831 n. 12 (D. Md. 1967). The Supreme
Court's opinion agreed with the ruling of the court below, 392 U.S. 183, 199-200, point-
ing to the separability provision of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 219 (1970), and the abstract na-
ture of the question.
5 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
" The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
59 452 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1971).
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While the eleventh amendment by its terms bars only suits in federal
courts against a state by citizens of another state, it has traditionally
been interpreted as a bar against suits by citizens of the same state as
well.6 Nonetheless, it is clear that a state may be sued in a federal
court it if consents, and the consent may be express or by waiver. In
the 1964 case of Parden v. Terminal Railway Co., 6 1 the Court had held
that by continuing to operate a railroad, a state had impliedly consented
to suits by employees under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, there-
by waiving its eleventh amendment immunity. The issue in Employees,
then, was whether Missouri had consented to suits under the Fair Labor
Standards Act by continuing to operate its institutions after passage of
the FLSA. The majority opinion by Justice Douglas held that it had not.
The opinion first distinguished Parden on the ground that the rail-
road involved in that case was operated for profit and was a relatively
minor state function.62  The state institutions brought within the cover-
age of the FLSA, on the other hand, were much larger enterprises and
were not conducted for profit.63 Although Congress had clearly ex-
pressed its intent to include certain public employees within the minimum
wage and overtime sections of the Act, there was no amendment of the
enforcement provisions6 4 to expressly allow suit against the states which
employed them. The Court refused, therefore, to assume that Congress
had sub silentio required the states to waive their immunity from suit in
federal courts as a condition of continuing to operate major public insti-
tutions.6 Nor would the Court agree that Congress impliedly overrode
the states' immunity by the use of the commerce power.6 6 By denying
the employees' right to sue on their own behalf the Court did not entire-
ly deny them a remedy, since the FLSA allowed the Secretary of Labor
to sue in their behalf 67 and the Court reasoned that he was an appro-
priate party to handle "the delicate federal-state relationship."M
Following the decision in Employees Congress moved quickly in the
1974 amendments to the FLSA to expressly provide to individual em-
ployees a right to sue "in any Federal or State court of competent juris-
6 This has been the rule since the decision in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
See note 127 infrb.
61 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
62 411 U.S. at 284-85.
61 Id. at 284.
64 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1970).
65 411 U.S. at 285.
11 Id. at 286-87.
67 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970). However, Justice Brennan's dissent pointed out that
"the Secretary of Labor has neither the staff nor resources to take on the enormous num-
ber of claims counted upon to be vindicated in private actions." 411 U.S. at 305.
Suits brought by the Secretary of Labor would not be barred by the eleventh amendment,
since they are considered to be suits by the United States, e.g. Mitchell v. Robert De-
Mario Jewelry, Inc., 260 F.2d 929, 932 (5th Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 361 U.S. 288
(1960). That the eleventh amendment does not provide the states with immunity from
suit by the United States was decided in United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140
(1965).
61 411 U.S. at 286.
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diction."6 9  Congress' now-clear intent7° has had little impact, however,
since the extension of the minimum wage and overtime provisions to all
public employees was struck down in National League.
4. Passage of the 1974 Amendments
It took the Ninety-third Congress two tries to successfully extend the
coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act to non-supervisory public
employees. President Nixon vetoed the amendments to the FLSA
passed by Congress in 1973, based in part on his opposition to the ex-
panded coverage. 7' During legislative hearings, the Nixon Administra-
tion had previously opposed the proposal to include public employees,
arguing that it would be too great an interference with state preroga-
tives.72  Congress had little reason to fear, however, that either the 1973
or 1974 amendments would be declared unconstitutional. Wirtz had
upheld coverage of public school, institutional, and transit employees,
and Department of Labor estimates showed that .the extention of the
minimum wage and overtime provisions to other non-supervisory public
employees would have a minimal fiscal impact on state and local gov-
ernments, smaller in fact than that of the 1966 amendments .73  Fur-
thermore, the amendments in their final form required premium pay
for police, fire, and correctional employees only if they worked in ex-
cess of fifty-four hours per week averaged over a four-week period.
7 4
It appeared therefore that the political process had produced a bill that
included concessions to valid budgetary concerns at the state and local
level.75  Moreover, the legislative history reveals an express finding by
Congress that public employment has an impact on commerce. This
impact results both from large purchases of goods, and from large gov-
6' Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(d)(1), 88 Stat.
55 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1970)).
70 The legislative history of the amendments makes it clear that Congress intended to
alter the outcome in Employees. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, H.R.
REP. No. 93-913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CON(;. & AD.
NEWS 2811, 2853.
71 See Message from the President of the United States Vetoing H.R. 7935, H.R. Doc.
No. 93-147, 93d Cong., 1st Sess 3 (1973).
72 Proposed Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act: Hearings on H.R. 4757
Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., 259 (1973) (statement of Peter J. Brennan).
71 See H.R. REP. No. 93-913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2838. These estimates indicated that 138,000 additional
public employees would be benefitted by a minimum wage of $2.30 per hour. The
House Report indicated that the total number of state and local employees at that time
was 6.3 million. According to the House Report, if a 40-hour week had been imposed on
all covered employees, the impact on state and local budgets as a result of having to pay
time-and-one-half for overtime would have been less than one per cent of their present pay-
roll as of the date of the report.
14 This figure was to be lowered by the Secretary of Labor on January 1, 1978 to the
average number of hours worked in a 28-day period by public safety employees, if that
average was less than 216. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
259, § 6 (c)(1)(D), 88 Stat. 55, 61.
15 Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 877 n. 13 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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ernment payrolls. The amendments undoubtedly reflected legitimate
congressional concern that the benefits previously accorded employees
in the private sector should not be withheld from the growing numbers
of public employees. 76 Thus, given the concessions to critical local
safety services, and given Justice Harlan's broad holding in Wirtz that
no state activities are immune from a valid exercise of the commerce
power,77 there was good reason for Congress to assume that the 1974
amendments would withstand Supreme Court scrutiny.
I. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES V. USERY
A. The Case Below
The 1974 amendments took effect generally on May 1, 1974,78
though the provisions relating to law enforcement, fire, and correctional
security personnel were not to be effective until January 1, 1975.79 On
December 31, 1974, a three judge district court refused the petition of
the National League of Cities and a number of state and local govern-
mental bodies to enjoin the application of the amendments about to go
into effect."' The court felt bound by Wirtz, although it expressed
reservations about the amendments' constitutionality."' Later that same
day, however, Chief Justice Burger, acting as Circuit Judge, entered an
interim order granting temporary injunctive relief pending appeal to the
full Court.12
B. The Majority Opinion83
The issue as framed by the Supreme Court was whether the manner
in which Congress chose to exercise its power under the commerce
clause breached an affirmative doctrine of inter-governmental immunity
and was therefore unconstitutional.8 4  Recognizing that the commerce
power is limited by certain individual rights8 5 contained in the first
ten amendments, the majority submitted that similar limits are placed
upon that power by the rights of the states."6 The policy of federalism
76 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, S. REP. No. 93-690, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 24 (1974).
77 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
71 Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 29 (a), 88 Stat. 55 (1974).
71 Pub. L. No. 93-259, §§ 6(c)(1)(A), 6(c)(2)(B), 88 Stat. 55 (1974).
6 National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974).
I' ld. at 827.
2 419 U.S. 1321 (1974). Probable jurisdiction was noted by the Supreme Court, 420
U.S. 906 (1975), but no decision was reached during the 1974 term. The case was re-
argued during the 1975 term.
13 Justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart,
Blackmun, and Powell. Justice Blackmun also wrote a concurring opinion. All
of these justices had been appointed to the Court since the decision in Wirtz, except
Justice Stewart who had joined in the dissent in that earlier opinion.
4 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 (1976).
Id. at 842.
16 ld. at 842-46.
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was found to be embodied in the tenth amendment.87 As interpreted by
the Court, this policy may be infringed upon by laws, otherwise within
the plenary power of the national government, when these laws are di-
rected "to the states as states."8
Having assumed that the determination of the wages, hours, and over-
time compensation of state employees was "an undoubted attribute of
state sovereignty," the Court considered whether the right to make the
determination was a function "essential to separate and independent exis-
tence" of the states.89 Since the principal concern was with the right
of the states and lopal governments to make these decisions, questions
of the precise financial impact of the FLSA amendments were consid-
ered to be of secondary importance.90 Nevertheless, the opinion noted
the appellants' claims that there would be significant increases in cost,
and that certain programs would necessarily have to be diminished or
abandoned altogether.9' The appellees argued that the increased cost of
overtime could be avoided by hiring additional employees who could be
paid at the non-premium rate, and that this would further the policy of
Congress to increase employment. 92 The Court rejected this argument,
recognizing that although there was a rational relationship to commerce,
the amendments would force state and local governments to alter tradi-
tional methods of delivering services. The Court noted further that local
policies regarding compensatory time and volunteerism would be ad-
versely affected.93
The conclusion of the Court was that regardless of the exact financial
burdens, "both the minimum wage and the maximum hour provisions
will impermissibly interfere with the integral government functions" of
State and local governments. 94 The Court specifically mentioned five
services which have traditionally been rendered by these bodies, and
which to a large degree constitute their raison d'etre: "fire prevention,
police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation."95
Loss of control over these and other traditional operations would leave
" Id. at 842. Although the Court's opinion stated that this policy of federalism was
embodied in the tenth amendment, the Court did not hold that the tenth amendment itself
was a bar to the passage of the FLSA amendments being considered. For further dis-
cussion of this point, see the text commencing at note 112 infra.
Il Id. at 845.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 846.
91 Id. at 847-48.
92 Id. at 849 (citing Brief for Appellee at 43).
13 Id. at 850-51. While Mr. Justice Brennan conceeded in his dissent that the exact
financial impact of the amendments was not material to the underlying issues of federalism,
he noted that there was no agreement between the two sides as to the extent of this im-
pact. He further noted that the Secretary of Labor "vigorously argue[d] in this Court
that appellants' cost allegations are greatly exaggerated and based on misinterpretations
of the 1974 amendments." Id. at 874 n. 12.
94 Id. at 851.
95 Id. at 851. The Court pointed out in a footnote that "[tihese examples are ob-
viously not an exhaustive catalogue of the numerous line and support activities which
are well within the area of traditional operations of state and local governments." Id.
at 851 n. 16.
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little of the "separate and independent existence of the states." 6 Based
on these conclusions, the Court held that Congress had exceeded its
power, and that the amendments were unconstitutional:
This exercise of congressional authority does not comport with
the federal system of government embodied in the Constitution.
We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to
directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not
within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.97
The Court then proceeded to distinguish United States v. Fry,98 and
to overrule Wirtz. Fry was distinguished because it involved an emer-
gency measure, and because the terms of the regulation were carefully
tailored in time and scope to meet a national crisis. In addition, no
financial burdens were placed upon the states, and no new choices man-
dated. The states were simply told to maintain for a time the positions
that they had already chosen. The Court declined to distinguish Wirtz,
however, rejecting the argument of the appellees that the activities cov-
ered by the 1966 FLSA amendments only applied to governments
when they entered fields simultaneously engaged in by private employ-
ers. Since those earlier amendments affected employment decisions re-
lating to schools and hospitals, and since schools and hospitals were
no less traditional governmental services than those reached by the
1974 amendments, Wirtz could not stand.99 Thus the Court reinforced
the position, minimized if not repudiated in Wirtz, that there is an es-
sential constitutional distinction between legislation aimed at the
"states as states" and that aimed at businesses and individuals. 0 0
Justice Blackmun joined in the opinion of the Court, but also sub-
mitted a concurring opinion. His understanding of the majority opinion
was that it implied a "balancing" test, and that congressional regula-
tion of the states would still be permissible if justified by a more sub-
stantial national interest in uniformity among the states.' 0 '
90 Id. at 851 (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)). In Coyle, the Court
invalidated a provision of the federal enabling act admitting Oklahoma to the union which
provided that the state capital would not be removed from Guthrie, Oklahoma until 1913.
The Court held that Congress could not place restrictions on a state's ability to locate its
capital once it had become a state, and that to allow Congress to do so as an exercise of its
power to admit states would have placed Oklahoma on a different footing than other states.
U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 3. The Court noted further that the power to require a state to
locate its capital in one 1Place is not referable to any constitutional power.
97 426 U.S. at 852 (footnote omitted).
98 421 U.S. 542 (1975). In this case, an important prelude to National League,
the Court upheld the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 as applied to state governments.
The purpose of this Act was to give the President power to control inflation, and regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to the Act placed a freeze on all wages and salaries.
Although the Act did not expressly authorize control of the earnings of state employees,
Justice Marshall's opinion found that the legislative history and wording of the Act
"leave no doubt" that they were to be covered. Id. at 545-46.
99 426 U.S. at 855.
100 Id. at 854.
101 Id. at 856.
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C. The Dissenters
Justice Brennan's long, impassioned dissent attacked the majority
opinion as ignoring judicial precedent, as importing "nothing but dis-
pleasure with a congressional judgement," 1°2 and as "a catastrophic
judicial body blow at Congress' power under the commerce clause."1 3
His argument was essentially that there is no affirmative state sover-
eignty right, and that the only limits upon Congress within the bounds
of the commerce power are self-imposed political judgements. 10 4 It is
to Congress that the Constitution delegates the responsibility of protect-
ing state interests, by virtue of the election of representatives to that body.
The judiciary has no such constitutional charge.10 5  The states, more-
over, have more than sufficient power to protect their interests. The
responsibility of the Court, on the other hand, should be to protect the
national government against the erosion of its power by the States.108
Justice Stevens' dissent, while agreeing with the majority that the
policy judgments of Congress had been unwise, adopted the view that
the Court was without constitutional support in declaring the amend-
ments to be invalid since Congress had acted within the scope of its
delegated powers .107
IV. THE NATURE OF THE AFFIRMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
BREACHED BY CONGRESS IN EXTENDING THE FLSA
TO STATE AND .LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
A. The Necessary and Proper Clause
The essential difference between the majority and the dissent in
National League was in their approach to determining the boundary be-
tween state and national power. The majority's position was that there
is an affirmative, constitutionally-based right of sovereignty which pro-
tects the states, even though Congress may be acting within the scope of
its delegated powers to regulate private interests. The dissent, on the
other hand, argued that a delegated power is just that. Notwithstand-
ing the fact that the scope of congressional power may have been
formulated in cases involving regulations of private interests, the dis-
sent argued that until Congress exceeds the scope of its delegated pow-
102 Id. at 872.
103 Id. at 880.
104 Id. at 857.
105 id. at 876.
106 Id. at 878. See note 26 supra. One commentator has argued that Congress tends
to be protective of the sovereignty rights of the states, and that the Framers of the Constitu-
tion viewed this as one of the important roles of the legislative branch in the national
government. The Supreme Court was conceived as the one branch of the government
whose "prime function" would be "the maintenance of national supremacy against
nullification or usurpation by the individual states." Wechsler, The Political Safeguards
of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558-59 (1954).
107 426 U.S. at 880-81.
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ers, the states have only their political clout to temper Congress' un-
questioned power.
One method of conceptualizing this disagreement is to examine briefly
the seminal case of McCulloch v. Maryland,10 8 in which Chief Justice
Marshall discussed the scope of the necessary and proper clause."19 To
speak of the scope of the commerce or other delegated powers is actually
to refer to the scope of this important section of the Constitution. 0 The
broad discretion given to Congress to carry into execution its delegated
powers was laid out boldly in McCulloch as follows: "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional.""'
The dissents in National League appear to have focused principally
upon this first part of this passage, that the means need only be "ap-
propriate" and "plainly adapted" to a permissible end. The majority,
on the other hand, argued that while the means chosen by Congress may
have been permissible under other circumstances, they did not "consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution" since the constitution itself
is premised upon the existence of not only a national government, but
viable state governments as well.
B. The Tenth Amendment
A major problem in understanding the meaning of National League
is that while Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority made it clear
that the extension of the FLSA to state and local government employees
transgressed an affirmative constitutional right, he did not specifically
define that right nor indicate its source in the Constitution. One pos-
sible source is the guarantee clause," 2 but no reference is made to this
source in the opinion, and the Court has traditionally considered the
guarantee clause to be non-justiciable." 3
The Court's opinion does refer to the tenth amendment as a declara-
tion of the limit upon Congress' power to regulate the States.1 4 While
101 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
101 "The Congress shall have power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
110 The necessary and proper clause applies to powers delegated in other articles as
well as to article I. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 266-67
(9th ed. 1975). See also Brief of the National Assoc. of Counties as Amicus Curiae,
passim, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which contains a
thorough discussion of the application of the necessary and proper clause to the facts in
the National League case.
1" 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
112 "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a Republican Form
of Government .. " U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
113 GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1624 (9th ed. 1975).
But see EPA v. Brown, 521 F.2d 827, 838 (9th Cir. 1975). vacated, 97 S. Ct. 1635 (1977).
114 426 U.S. at 842.
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Justice Rehnquist's reference to this amendment indicates that he views
it as a significant expression of policy underlying the Constitution, it is
probably true that the Court would have reached the same decision even
if the tenth amendment had not been adopted. This position was urged
expressly in the Appellants' brief," 5 and is supported by the treatment
of the tenth amendment by members of the Court in Kecent cases and
by the wording of the amendment itself.
From approximately 1837 to 1937116 the Supreme Court took the
position that the tenth amendment mandated a system of "dual sov-
ereignty" between the national and state governments. The gist of this
position. was that there was a domain of local affairs not subject to
federal regulation, and reserved to the states under the tenth amend-
ment." 7  This view was abandoned in NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin
Steel Corp."" There the Court held that the relationship between
employer and employee could be regulated when it affected interstafe
commerce and was therefore within the scope of national power not-
withstanding that the relationship was local in character.11 9 Then, in
United States v. Darby, the Court declared that the tenth amendment
"states but a truism that all is retained which has not been sur-
rendered."' 2 0  Since Darby the predominant view of the tenth amend-
ment has been that it confers no substantive rights over local affairs
upon the states, but serves merely as a reminder that the national gov-
ernment is one of specific delegated powers.' 21  The real issue where
115 [E]ven without such an amendment those who wrote the Constitution were
unanimous in their view that the "Federalism" principles contained in the Consti-
tution prior t and without the words of the Tenth Amendment guaranteed non-
interference by either Federal or State Governments with the essential govern-
mental powers of each. The decision here must therefore consider the whole of
the Constitution to correctly evaluate the powers, functions, and cooperative
"Federalism" thereby created.
Brief for Appellant, at 53, 59-60, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
"Federalism" looks to the entire Constitution as its constitutional basis. The
Tenth Amendment is an additional and a specific bar to the takeover of state and
local Government functions by the Federal Government under the 1974 Amend-
ments.
Id. at 59-60.
See note 118 supra.
17 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918). In this case the Court
held unconstitutional a federal law which would have closed the channels of interstate com-
merce to goods produced by child labor. The Court's holding was based on the concept
that production is purely a local matter, subject only to the state's police power. Id. at
273-74. This case was overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-117
(1941).
'I 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
119 Id. at 37.
120 Justice Stone's opinion for the Court continued:
There is nothing in the history of [the tenth amendment's] adoption to suggest that
it is more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state
governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment
or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national government
might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able
to exercise fully their reserved powers.
312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
I One commentator has labelled the two principal schools of opinion regarding the 16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol26/iss2/4
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"local" affairs are concerned is to determine the scope of the delegated
powers, and once it is determined that the national government is acting
within the scope of these powers, the investigation ends without need to
consider the scope of state powers of regulation.
In the 1975 decision of Fry v. United States, however, Justice Mar-
shall stated in a footnote that "[w]hile the Tenth Amendment has been
characterized as a 'truism' . . . it is not without significance. '"122  Most
of this footnote was incorporated into the opinion of the Court in National
League, and the two opinions taken together perhaps suggest that the
Court is returning to the view of the tenth amendment which predomi-
nated until the Jones and Laughlin Steel case; namely, that the amend-
ment reserves a discrete area of local activities not open to federal regula-
tion.
Several factors tend to discredit this suggestion. First, the words of
the tenth amendment refer to "powers not delegated to the United
States." The Court's opinion in National League adopts the position
that Congress has plenary power to regulate commerce and activities
affecting commerce.ln2 No argument is made that government em-
ployment does not affect commerce and therefore falls outside the scope
of this plenary power. Rather, the argument is that the plenary power
cannot be exercised because it breaches the affirmative constitutional
barrier of the sovereignty rights of the states. 12 4 Since the tenth amend-
ment reserves only "powers not delegated to the United States", it can-
not in itself be the source of affirmative constitutional rights other than
the right to be protected against exercises of non-delegated power.12 5
A second factor which indicates that the Supreme Court in National
League is not returning to the discredited view of the tenth amendment
is suggested in Justice Rehnquist's dissent only one year earlier in Fry.
There he objected to the extension of wage and price guidelines to state
governments using essentially the same reasoning as in his opinion for
the Court in National League. His position in Fry was that the tenth
and the eleventh 2 8 amendments are not necessary to establish certain
tenth amendment as Hamiltonian and Madisonian. The Hamiltonian view is that the
national government may exercise its delegated powers to their fullest extent without
regard for the powers of the states. This view is said to have predominated from the
adoption of the tenth amendment in 1791 until 1837, and to have received its fullest
articulation in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) and Cibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)l (1824). The second school, the Madisonian, holds that the
Constitution, particularly the tenth amendment, establishes a compact between the na-
tional and state governments pursuant to which the "accustomed" powers of the states
may not be abridged. This view first received Supreme Court approval in the case of
New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) and prevailed until NLRB v. Jones and
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) resurrected the Hamiltonian interpretation.
Castro, The Doctrinal Development of the Tenth Amendment, 51 W. VA. L. Q. 227 (1949).
2  Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975). The footnote continued in
part: "The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to
function effectively in a federal system.
"23426 U.S. at 841.
124 Id.
"35See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HAnV. L. REv. 693, 702 (1974).
126 "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
1977)
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1977
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
sovereignty rights of the states.1 27  The source of these rights is rather
in the fabric of the entire Constitution and the system it created, a
system based upon the understanding of the Framers that there should
be viable state governments as well as a national government. It follows
that there is a basic difference between this view and the dual sovereignty
approach. In part, this difference relates to the fact that the dual
sovereignty approach was applied in cases where private businesses were
claiming that their local activities were subject only to state regulation. 128
The newer view of state sovereignty rights, on the other hand, applies
only where regulations are applied to states qua states. The other part
of the difference seems to be that while the old view of the tenth amend-
ment viewed a discrete area of activities as immune from federal regula-
tion, the newer view implies a "structural" approach. 2 9  Since the
tenth amendment does not reserve state sovereignty over any particular
set of activities, even activities of the state governments themselves,
decisions must be based upon reasoning from the text of the Constitution
as a whole.13
0
C. Sources of the Sovereignty Right in National League
Accepting the premise that the majority in National League did not
return to the view, discredited since the Jones and Laughlin Steel case,
that there are certain purely local concerns not amenable to federal
power, the problem of determining the scope and origin of the sov-
ereignty right acknowledged to exist in National League becomes more
complex. The approach taken by the Court was first to draw an analogy
to certain individual- rights, the right to a jury trial and to fifth amend-
ment due process, which undeniably limit otherwise valid exercises of
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
127 Justice Rehnquist's position that the tenth and eleventh amendments are not neces-
sary for the establishment of the sovereignty rights of the states was based on an analysis
of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). While the eleventh amendment provides ex-
pressly that states are immune from suits brought in federal courts by citizens of other
states or countries, it is silent as to suits by citizens of the same state. However, in Hans
the court extended this immunity to suits brought by citizens of the same state. Justice
Rehnquist argued that the ground of that decision was a constitutional right of sov-
ereignty which underlies the tenth and eleventh amendments, and is broader than the
terms of either:
As it was not the Eleventh Amendment by its terms which justified the result in
Hans, it is not the Tenth Amendment by its terms that prohibits congressional ac-
tion which sets a mandatory ceiling on the wages of all state employees. Both
Amendments are simply examples of the understanding of those who drafted and
ratified the Constitution that the states were sovereign in many respects, and that
although their legislative authority could be superseded by Congress in many
areas where Congress was competent to act, Congress was nonetheless not free to
deal with a State as if it were just another individual or business enterprise subject
to regulation.
421 U.S. 542, 556-57.
121 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
121 See BLACK, STRucTuRE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
130 This approach is consistent with Chief Justice Marshall's mention of the need for
considering the "letter and spirit" of the Constitution in McCulloch. See text accompany-
ing notes 108-11 supra.
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the commerce power.131  The Court then suggested that there is a similar,
constitutionally-based protection for the sovereignty rights of the states,
and proceeded to argue that this right had been recognized in a number
of cases. Not all the cases cited by the Court provided clear authority
for this assertion, however, and other cases were not satisfactorily dis-
tinguished.
While it was stated in Texas v. White, for example, that "the con-
stitution . . . looks to an indestructible union of indestructible
states," 13 2 that case established the right of the provisional government
of Texas, created by Congress after the Civil War, to sue in a federal
court. While the importance of the states to the union was no doubt
recognized, the decision of the court in Texas v. White served to preserve
the provisional government's right to United States treasury bonds il-
legally transferred to individuals by the admittedly invalid state govern-
ment during the Civil War. Thus, the case involved protections for Texas
against acts of an illegal state government and not against Acts of Con-
gress.
Similarly, while Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell contains the statement
that "neither government may destroy the other nor curtail in any sub-
stantial manner the exercise of its powers," 133 that case upheld the
federal tax in question as applied to an independent contractor working
for a state. Moreover, the intergovernmental tax immunities which the
opinion assumed to be valid were severely curtailed by later cases.
134
Lane County v. Oregon135 is perhaps stronger authority, but the national
interest to be protected in that case was tangential at best, and the
case was ultimately resolved in large part upon grounds of statutory
construction. 36
131 426 U.S. at 833, 841 (citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (right to
jury trial), and Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (fifth amendment due process)).
This analogy is somewhat misleading, however, since the guarantees of individual rights
are set forth clearly in the Bill of Rights, and by their terms they limit the means avail-
able to Congress to carry out its delegated powers. See quotation from McCulloch v.
Maryland at note 111 supra.
132 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868), quoted in National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833, 844 (1976). In Texas v. White the provisional government of Texas was
suing defendants who had obtained United States treasury bonds from the Confederate
government of Texas during the Civil War. The bonds were to be used to obtain needed
supplies. The provisional government sought to stop payment on the bonds by the United
States, and to secure their return.
-1 Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938), severely limited the immunity from
federal taxation previously enjoyed by state employees, and Graves v. New York ex rel
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) did away with it altogether. New York v. United States,
326 U.S. 572 (1946), is a key case in this area. It is discussed in the text commencing
at note 140 infra.
134 See note 133 supra.
135 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868).
136 In this case the Court upheld an Oregon law requiring that state taxes be paid in
gold and silver coin, despite a federal statute authorizing the issuance of notes, and de-
claring that they "shall be receivable of all taxes, internal duties, excises, debts and
demands due to the United States . . . and shall be lawful money and legal tender in
payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States." While arguing that
the federal government could not interfere with the state's exercise of its taxing power,
the Court also pointed out that the first quoted clause of the statute refers to taxes due
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The Court's citation to Wirtz presented similar problems. The major-
ity opinion quoted Wirtz, stating that the Court "had ample power to
prevent the utter destruction of the State as a sovereign political
entity."'13 7 That statement, as Justice Brennan pointed out in his dis-
sent, 38 is quoted out of context. The power referred to is clearly the
power of the Court to assure that Congress does in fact regulate com-
merce or activities having an impact on commerce, not the power to
protect affirmative sovereignty rights. This view is supported by the fact
that the majority in National League found it necessary to overrule the
broad doctrine set forth in Wirtz.' 9
This is not to imply that judicial affirmation of the sovereignty rights
of states is unprecedented. The most convincing authorities are Chief
Justice Stone's opinion in New York v. United States140 concerning the
scope of the federal power to tax, and the footnote from United States
v. Fry14 ' on the significance of the tenth amendment. In the former case,
the Court upheld a general federal tax which had been applied to the
State of New York's production of mineral water, as well as to private
production. Justice Frankfurter's plurality opinion, joined in only by
Justice Rutledge,142 upheld the tax on the ground that it was non-
discriminatory, but Chief Justice Stone's concurring opinion, joined in by
three other Justices on an eight-member court, went still further in
declaring that even a non-discriminatory tax might be unconstitu-
tional. 43  This would be the case if there were infringement upon a
state's "performance of its functions as a government which the consti-
tution recognizes as sovereign.'" 44  The opinion then asserted that
"neither government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial
manner the exercise of its powers. " 145  Thus New York v. United States
gives support to the proposition that the states qua states do have an
immunity from certain forms of federal taxation. The boundaries of this
immunity are uncertain, however, and its scope must therefore be gauged
on a case by case basis. One expression of the parameters of inter-
governmental immunity is.found in the footnote from Fry:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a
"truism," stating merely that all is retained which has not been
surrendered it is not without significance. The Amendment
to the United States, but not those due to the states. 74 U.S. at 78-79. Further, the
Court cited a number of cases which had held that a tax is not a debt. Id. at 79-80. There-
fore, the Court stated that it would not assume that Congress intended to include payment
of state taxes within the statute, id. at 81, and decided the case on statutory grounds.
131 426 U.S. at 842 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968)).
13 426 U.S. at 860 n. 3.
139 See text accompanying notes 46-51 supra.
140 New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (opinion of Stone, C.J.).
4I See note 122 supra and accompanying text. -
142 326 U.S. 572, 584 (1946).
143 Id. at 587 (opinion of Stone, C.J.).
144 Id. at 588.
145 Id. at 589 (quoting Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926)). This
passage is also quoted in the National League opinion. 426 U.S. at 844.
(Vol. 26:259
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expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity
or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.
141
The reliance upon Fry is the keystone of the National League hold-
ing despite the Court's mention of New York v. United States, because
Fry indicated that there are limits of state sovereignty upon the exercise
of the commerce power as well as upon the taxing power. Although
there is logical consistency in Justice Rehnquist's position that there is
no difference between the limits upon these two powers,1 47 the position
of the Court in United States v. California was clearly to the contrary.'4
Justice Rehnquist also suggested in his National League opinion that not
all of the powers delegated to the national government are necessarily
subject to the same restraints. The spending power, 149 the powers dele-
gated under section five of the fourteenth amendment, 50 and the power
to make war151 are specifically excluded from the Court's holding. That
the fourteenth amendment was especially directed at the states and that
Congress is given the power to assure compliance with its commands
is evident from the face of the amendment.'5 2  That the states as a
result have less protection against national intrusions on their sovereignty
' National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842-43 (quoting Fry v. United
States. 421 U.S. at 547 n. 7 (1975) (citation omitted)). It is perhaps interesting to note
that Justice Marshall's opinion in Fry contains no authority for the proposition, and that
he dissented from the majority's interpretation of it in National League.
147 See note 148 infra.
'- 297 U.S. 175, 183-185 (1936). Chief Justice Stone's opinion for a unanimous
Court, stated:
[W]e look to the activities in which the states have traditionally engaged as
marking the boundary of the restriction upon the federal taxing power. But there
is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce. The State can
no more deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can
an individual.
Id. at 185. This followed the statement that:
The analogy of the constitutional immunity of state instrumentalities from fed-
eral taxation ... is not illuminating. That immunity is implied from the nature
of our federal system and the relationship within it of state and national govern-
ments, and is equally a restriction on taxation by either of the instrumentalities
of the other. Its nature requires that it be so construed as to allow to each
government reasonable scope for its taxing power, see Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell,
269 U.S. 514, 522-524, which would be unduly curtailed if either by extending
its activities could withdraw from the taxing power of the other subjects of taxa-
tion traditionally within it.
Id. at 184 (citations omitted).
In the majority opinion in National League, Justice Rehnquist distinguished United
Stateff.v. California from the facts at bar, and characterized the first passage quoted
above as "dicta," and "simply wrong." He argued that the state-owned railroad which
was regulated in California was "not in an area that the States have regarded as integral
parts of their governmental activities." 426 U.S. at 854 & n. 18. Applying the FLSA to
regulate hours and wages of state employees, on the other hand, did interfere with integral
state activities, and therefore was unconstitutional.
119 426 U.S. at 852 n. 17.
150 Id.
151 426 U.S. at 855 n. 18.
152 E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall make or enforce any law."
Congressional power is further defined in section 5, where it is stated: "The Congress shall
have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." 21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1977
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based upon the fourteenth amendment than they have against in-
trusions based upon article I, section 8 powers was confirmed in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.I5 3  But it is more difficult, in theory at least, to
decipher the reasons why sovereignty restraints upon the spending and
war powers should differ from those upon the commerce and taxing
powers. All four powers are contained in section 8 of article I, and
all pose potentially grave threats to state sovereignty. In terms of the
National League holding this is true a fortiori, since tax immunity
cases 5 4 were cited to support the doctrine of sovereignty which the
opinion sought to establish. The express justification for relying upon
the tax cases in determining the scope of the commerce power in Na-
tional League was that both of these powers were delegated in article
I, section 8.15 Therefore, the attempt by the Court without further
explanation to distinguish away cases involving certain article I powers,
while relying on the tax cases, is unsettling.
Two cases relied upon by Justice Brennan in his dissent, and not
adequately distinguished by the majority, are pertinent here: Case v.
Bowles'56 and Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States.17  While
the former case involved the exercise of the war power to control the
price at which the State of Washington sold timber grown on federally
granted land to raise revenue for the public schools, the holding is
broad enough for application to other article I powers. The state
argued that the federal government could not interfere because the sale
"was for the purpose of gaining revenue to carry out an essential gov-
ernment function - the education of its citizens."' 8  Justice Black's
opinion for the Court rejected any distinction between essential and
other state functions, 5 9 and focused instead on whether the national
1 427 U.S. 445. 455-56 (1976). This case was decided one week after National
League and is discussed in the text at note 173 infra. Although Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
rejected a claim of state immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment, and National
League of Cities involved policies embodied in the tenth amendment, the opinion in the
former case made no distinction between intrusions into the "judicial, executive, and
legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States." 427 U.S. at 455.
See also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 556-57 (dissenting opinion of Rehnquist, J.),
discussed in note 127 supra and accompanying text.
154 Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269
U.S. 514 (1926); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
155 MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN suggests that "the Chief Justice was addressing not
the question of a state sovereignty restraint upon the exercise of the commerce
power, but rather the principle of implied immunity of the States and Federal
Government from taxation by the other .... ." Post, at 863-864. The asserted
distinction, however, escapes us. Surely the federal power to tax is no less a
delegated power than is the commerce power: both find their genesis in Art. I,
§ 8. Nor can characterizing the limitation recognized upon the federal taxing
power as an "implied immunity" obscure the fact that this "immunity" is de-
rived from the sovereignty of the States and the concomitant barriers which such
sovereignty presents to otherwise plenary federal authority.
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 843-44 n. 14.
' 327 U.S. 92 (1946).
266 U.S. 405 (1925).
151 Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946).
15' Justice Douglas dissented on grounds of statutory construction. He argued that
the Emergency Price Control Act could be construed to exclude the states, and that the
[Vol. 26:259
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government was within the scope of its powers. Finding that the war
power did include the power to control prices, the Court summarily
rejected the state's tenth amendment sovereignty argument. 60  The
holding in Case runs counter to the suggestion in National League that
"essential" state decisions as to "integral governmental functions" are
not subject to federal interference.'16
In the Sanitary District case, Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court
granted an injunction against the public corporation responsible for
sewage disposal for the City of Chicago to prevent excessive lowering
of the water level of Lake Michigan. The Court found the Sanitary
District's actions to be contrary to federal statute and an interference
with the national power to regulate commerce. Noting that "this is not
a controversy between equals," 62 the Court held that "the authority of
the United States to remove obstructions to interstate commerce...
is superior to that of the States to provide for the welfare or necessities
of their inhabitants."'' 6  This again runs counter to the idea of im-
munity from the application of the national commerce power to un-
deniably essential services'6 4 provided by local governments.
Court should adopt that interpretation to avoid "serious constitutional questions." The
reasons for his dissent are actually set forth in Hulbert v. Twin Falls County, 327 U.S.
103, 105-06 (1946), to which he refers in Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 103 (1946).
' Since the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, it has seldom if ever been
doubted that Congress has power in order to attain a legitimate end - that is, to
accomplish the full purpose of a granted authority - to use all appropriate means
plainly adapted to that end, unless inconsistent with other parts of the Constitu-
tion. And we have said, that the Tenth Amendment "does not operate as a
limitation upon the powers, express or implied, delegated to the national govern-
ment."
327 U.S. at 102 (citation omitted).
161 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976). The holding in Case
goes beyond that in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1976), because the result of the
decision in Case was that there was both an interference with essential state operations
(education) and a deprivation of revenue to be used for education. In Fry there was
interference with decision making but no reduction in revenue. The special considera-
tion given by the Court to interference with the states' budgets is evident in National
League. Compare Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S.
279, 286 (1973) (Court was hesitant to rule that Congress would subject the states to
double damage recovery suits by public employees under the FLSA without an express
provision to that effect) and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-65 (1974) (suits for
back damages by welfare clients against the states barred by the eleventh amendment)
with Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (injunctive relief was allowed against the
state, based on the fourteenth amendment). Less consideration is given to the fiscal
burden upon the state in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) because the claim
in that action was based on section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See text accompany-
ing notes 173-84 infra.
162 266 U.S. 405, 425 (1925).
'1 Id. at 426. The Court found that the national government also had authority to
prevent the draining of the lake under the treaty power, but the "main ground" was the
authority to regulate commerce. Id. at 425-26.
164 Sanitation, presumably including sewerage, was specifically mentioned by the
Court in National League as an essential and traditional governmental function. 426 U.S.
at 851 & n. 16.
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D. Immunity for Essential State and Local
Governmental Functions - A Summary
A review of the cases cited by the majority and the dissent in National
League reveals that there is ample support in past decisions 6 5 for a find-
ing that certain governmental functions of the states may not be imposed
upon by the national government, even when acting within its delegated
powers. There is also support, however, for the contrary conclusion.166
The shortcoming of the National League opinion is that it provides no
clear test for determining when state sovereignty prevails over the na-
tional interest. Furthermore, the Court's holding, read alone, implies
that certain state and local functions may never be interfered with under
the commerce power 167 regardless of the national interest involved.
This is the problem, arguably, which was recognized by Justice Blackmun
in his concurring opinion in National League and which led him to
suggest a balancing approach consistent with the Court's decision, but
which would allow consideration of a greater national interest than was
present in National League.16  Justice Blackmun's approval of a
balancing test in his concurrence, along with the fact that four justices
dissented,169 indicates that at least a bare majority of the court would
approve regulation of the states qua states under the commerce clause
given a sufficiently great national interest. A possible balancing ap-
proach is suggested in the final section of this Note.
V. INTERPRETATIONS OF NATIONAL LEAGUE BY LOWER COURTS
The difficulties inherent in the Supreme Court's holding in National
League became quickly apparent when a number of states and political
subdivisions7 ° faced with suits under the Equal Pay Act and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act moved for summary dismissals based
on National League. In all but two of these cases the defendants'
motions were denied, the courts holding that either the Equal Pay Act or
the Age Discrimination Act was applicable to public employers.' 7'
165 See notes 140-46 supra and accompanying text.
166 See notes 156-64 supra and accompanying text.
167 "We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions, they are not within the authority granted by Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3." 426
U.S. 833, 852. A footnote to the holding specifically excepts the question of its applica-
tion to the other article I powers, but the Court's action there is not consistent. See
notes 14547 supra and accompanying text.
168 426 U.S. at 856.
16'9 Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens dissented. Although the idea of a
balancing approach was not expressly adopted by the majority, it is not inconsistent with
the majority opinion. See text accompanying notes 230-37 infra.
170 Justice Rehnquist made it clear in his opinion that for purposes of applying the
National League doctrine, there is no difference between states and their political sub-
divisions. 426 U.S. 833, 855 n. 20.
171 Cases where motions to dismiss Equal Pay Act claims were denied include: Allegheny
County Inst. Dist. v. Usery, 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977);
Marshall v. City of Torrington, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5579 (D. Conn. 1977); Usery v. City of
Sheboygan, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6383 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Usery v. Kenosha Unified School
[Vol. 26:159
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Although the vast majority of the lower courts considering the ques-
tion held that the Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act continue to apply to public employers, their reasons for reach-
ing this conclusion have differed. Basically, these courts have adopted
one of two approaches. The first involved reliance upon the fourteenth
amendment and the Supreme Court's decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.172
The second approach was to apply and distinguish the Court's holding
regarding the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA con-
sidered in National League. This Note suggests that although there is a
clear justification for the lower courts' denial of the motions on the first
ground, the reliance upon National League in these cases was misplaced.
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Ground
1. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
That Congress has greater power to override state sovereignty con-
cerns pursuant to its power under section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment than under its article I powers was recognized by the Supreme
Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, decided one week after National League.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer involved a class action by retired male employees
of the State of Connecticut against the Chairman of the State Employees'
Retirement Commission. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been dis-
criminated against on the basis of sex by the state's retirement plan. 173
The suit was brought under the sex discrimination provisions of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,'7 4 which had been amended in 1972
to include public employers. 75  The defendant argued that the eleventh
Dist., 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6409 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Brennan v. A & M Consul. School
Dist., 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6756 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Usery v. Memphis State Univ., 13 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 6543 (W.D. Tenn. 1976); Usery v. Washoe County School Dist., 13 Empl. Prac.
Dec. 6213 (D. Nev. 1976); Usery v. Bettendorf Comm. School Dist., 12 Empl. Prac. Dec.
5446 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., 13 Empl. Prac. Dec.
6520 (D.S.C. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977); Brown v. County of Santa
Barbara, 427 F. Supp. 112 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Usery v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 421
F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Tex. 1976): Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976).
Motions to dismiss Equal Fay Act claims were granted in: Usery v. Owensboro-Daviess
County Hosp., 423 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1976), appeal filed, No. 77-3069 (6th Cir.
Dec. 20, 1976), and Howard v. Ward County, 418 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.D. 1976). It is
argued in this Note that these two cases reached an incorrect conclusion based on the
Supreme Court's opinion in National League. See the discussion commencing in the text
at note 216 infra.
172 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
173 Id. at 449, 450 n. 4.
174 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex
. . . ;or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's . . . sex . ...
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20(0e-2(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
175 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(1), 86 Stat. 103
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1970)).
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amendment barred any order prescribing retroactive damages against
the state,176 relying on Edelman v. Jordan.177  That case had held that a
suit by welfare clients for past benefits wrongfully denied could not be
maintained against the state. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court
in Fitzpatrick distinguished Edelman on the ground that neither of the
federal statutes underlying the welfare program in issue in Edelman had
authorized suits against a state.178  Furthermore, the Court found that
Parden v. Terminal Railway Co., 79 which had found an implied waiver
of eleventh amendment immunity, need not be distinguished due to the
differences between the types of state activity involved in that case and in
Fitzpatrick.'80 Parden involved state operation of a railroad, while Title
VII applies to all state and local employees in coverage virtually identical
to that of the Fair Labor Standards Act considered in National League.'
8
'
This refusal to distinguish Parden was based on the Court's finding that
the fourteenth amendment, is, unlike the commerce clause, "by [its]
express terms directed at the states."'182  Therefore, passage of that
amendment enlarged the power of Congress and diminished the sover-
eignty of the states. The states could not raise the eleventh amendment
as a bar to suits to enforce the substantive provisions of the fourteenth
amendment, since through ratification they had given Congress the
power to enforce those provisions under section five "by appropriate
legislation."'183 The state in Fitzpatrick did not argue that Title VII was
inappropriate legislation to enforce the equal protection clause.
18 4
178 The Act as amerfded allows employees to recover "back pay ... or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The plaintiffs
here were seeking retroactive retirement benefits allegedly denied them because of their
sex. 427 U.S. at 445, 449. There was no doubt but that any recovery would come from the
state treasury and not from the individual defendants. Id. at 452 n. 8.
177 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
178 427 U.S. at 451-52.
179 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
180 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-53 (1976).
1I National League did not overrule Parden because the Court specifically found that
railroads are not activities which "the States have regarded as integral parts of their
governmental activities." 426 U.S. 833, 854 n. 18.
182 427 U.S. at 453.
Section 1 . . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this Article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
183 The Court found support for this position in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,
238-39 (1972) (federal court may enjoin a state court proceeding in a suit based on 42
U.S.C. § 1983); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (uphording the
remedial provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which was passed pursuant to
section 2 of the fifteenth amendment); and Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880)
(denying writ of habeas corpus to state judge who had been jailed for excluding blacks
from juries in contravention of a federal statute).
184 427 U.S. at 456 n. 11. 26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol26/iss2/4
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2. The Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act in Light of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
The Equal Pay Act and the sex discrimination provisions of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have been considered by the courts to be
in pari materia, and are therefore to be construed in harmony.8 5
Although Title VII outlaws discrimination in all aspects of employment
while the Equal Pay Act applies only to compensation, the two pieces of
legislation are clearly related. For example, section 703(h) of Title VII
incorporates the employer defenses of the Equal Pay Act, providing in
part that:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this sub-
chapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in
determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to
be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is
authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29.186
This interrelationship has led to the rule that the Equal Pay Act provi-
sions may not be construed in such a way as to "undermine the Civil
Rights Act."187  This interpretation has allowed lower courts faced with
suits against public employers under the Equal Pay Act to avoid the
implications of the National League decision, since Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
had clearly held that public employers are subject to Title VII. The fact
that the FLSA and the Equal Pay Act were expressly based upon the
commerce clause'88 was not really a problem, given the acknowledged
similarity of the two sex discrimination acts, because Title VII had been
upheld as a proper exercise of the power granted to Congress in section
five of the fourteenth amendment. 89
Although Title VII does not contain provisions prohibiting discrimina-
tion based on age, the lower courts considering age discrimination claims
also relied in part on Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.90 These courts also assumed
that Congress had the power under section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment to pass the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in order to
'1s E.g., Orr v. Frank R. MacNeil & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1975).
See also Kanowitz, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
20 HAsrINCs L. J. 305, 345 (1968).
188 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). The reference to 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1) is of course
to the Equal Pay Act. That section allows differentials in rates of pay to members of the
opposite sex performing similar work "where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity
or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex,"
87 Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied. 398
U.S. 905 (1970).
1 See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
i "Nor do we attach any significance to the fact that the legislative history of the
Equal Pay Act does not explicitly rely on the fourteenth amendment. In exercising the
power of judicial review, as distinguished from the duty of statutory interpretation, we
are concerned with the actual powers of the national government." Allegheny County
Inst. Dist. v. Usery, 544 F.2d 148, 155 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977).
"' Aaron v. Davis, 424 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Ark. 1976); Usery v. Board of Education of
Salt Lake City, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5443 (D. Utah 1976).
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enforce equal protection of the laws.' 9' On this assumption, the Act
could then be applied to public employers under Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
and enforcement would not be inapplicable under National League.
While this argument is less clear than that favoring the constitutionality
of the Equal Pay Act since the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
has no counterpart in Title VII, one district court decision noted that
"[ilt is well settled that legislation authorized by section five of the
fourteenth amendment can prohibit practices which might pass muster
under the equal protection clause, absent an Act of Congress."'92  The
lower court cited no authority for this assertion, but its position would
seem to be supported by the ruling of the Supreme Court in Katzenbach
v. Morgan.193  In the Katzenbach case, the State of New York argued
that unless a state statute denying voting rights to Spanish speaking
persons had been found by the courts to violate equal protection, Con-
gress was without power to enforce the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which,
by requiring ballots to be printed in Spanish, effectively contravened the
New York policy of permitting only English-speaking citizens to vote.
The Court held, to the contrary, that section five grants to Congress the
discretion to decide which legislation is necessary to enforce equal
protection. The Court proceeded only to consider whether the legislation
was "appropriate" to the end sought.' 94  Under this liberal standard,
reinforced by the Court's approval of the sex discrimination provisions
of Title VII in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, there is little doubt that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act would withstand Supreme Court
scrunity. 195
B. The National League of Cities Ground
While it appears that Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer provided adequate authority
for upholding both the Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act as applied to public employers, only two courts were
content to rest their decisions on that ground alone. 96 While one
district court simply denied the defendant's motion without citation to
authority, 1' 7 the others have attempted in various ways to apply the
191 424 F. Supp. at 1241; 12 Ernpl. Prac. Dec. at 5446.
192 Aaron v. Davis, 424 F. Supp. at 1241 n. 2.
193 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
194 Id. at 651.
195 See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) where the
Supreme Court refused to find that age was a suspect classification which should be sub-
jected to strict judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause. The Court noted
explicitly, however, that this was not an action under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act. 427 U.S. at 310 n. 2. A majority of the Court has likewise declined to treat
sex as a suspect classification. E.g. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
6 Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 946 (1977); Usery v. Washoe County School Dist., 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6213
(D. Nev. 1976).
1w Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6520 (D.S.C. 1976).
This district court decision was subsequently affirmed by the Fourth Circuit and a written
opinion was issued. Usery v. Charleston County School District, 558 F.2d 1169 (4th
Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 26:259
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol26/iss2/4
FEDERALISM
Court's holding in National League. The majority of the courts which
applied the National League holding either concluded that the ability
to discriminate among persons on the basis of sex or age was not an
attribute of sovereignty, or applied a balancing approach. 19 8 Some
courts used both approaches. 199
1. The Attribute of Sovereignty Approach
An example of this approach is the decision in Christensen v.
Iowa.20 ° Here the district court noted first that the Supreme Court
in National League had considered only the minimum wage and over-
time provisions of the FLSA, and not the Equal Pay Act.201 The court
did not add, as some others did,20 2 that the FLSA contains a broad
severability provision stating that the entire Act would not be affected
if one section were to be declared invalid, or if the Act were declared to
be invalid as applied to a certain group of individuals. 203 The Christen-
sen decision then discussed a number of the key phrases from the Na-
tional League decision and applied them to the Equal Pay Act. In this
manner the court found that the ability of a state or local government to
deny equal pay for equal work was not a " 'function essential to separate
and independent existence' of the state."2 0 4  It found further that in
enacting the Equal Pay Act "Congress has not sought . . . 'to wield its
power in a fashion that would impair the States' ability to function in
the federal system,' " that "such discrimination cannot validly be con-
sidered a 'fundamental employment decision' upon which the state's
system for administering public laws and public services rests," and that
"such discrimination is not, consistent with equal protection, an 'at-
tribute of sovereignty.' "205 Adding these findings together, the court
concluded that the Equal Pay Act was a valid exercise of the commerce
power.206
2. The Balancing Approach in the Lower Courts
The district court decision in Usery v. Dallas Independent School
District207 provides a typical example of the use of a balancing approach
191 One court upheld the Equal Pay Act in part as an exercise of the spending power.
See Usery v. Memphis State Univ., 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6543 (W.D. Tenn. 1976).
199 E.g., Usery v. Kenosha Unified School Dist., 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6409 (E.D.
Wis. 1976).
200 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976).
201 Id. at 424.
202 See, e.g., Brown v. County of Santa Barbara, 427 F. Supp. 112 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
2-03 29 U.S.C. § 219 (1970). See text accompanying note 222 infra.
204 417 F. Supp. at 425.
205 Id.
206 Id.
20r 421 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Tex. 1976). There was at least one other clear ground for
the court's decision. This was that the Equal Pay Act did not increase budget pressures on
the states because they could lower the wages of men to equal those of women. Id. at
116. However, this would be clearly prohibited by the Act which provides in part that:
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in applying the National League holding. Here the court pointed out
that while in Fry v. United States2 8 the Supreme Court had upheld
federal control over the wages paid by state and local governments, the
Court in National League had overturned the minimum wage and over-
time provisions of the FLSA. Assuming that the two Supreme Court
decisions both involved legislation encroaching substantially upon "in-
tegral" state functions, the district court concluded that "[t]he two opin-
ions can be reconciled only on the basis of an ad .hoc balancing - a
conclusion strongly reinforced by the concurring opinion of Justice
Blackmun."2 °9  Based on this conclusion, the court found "that the
policies of social justice underlying the legislation outweigh the State
interest in exploiting employees because of their sex. '"2 1 0
C. Problems With The Commerce Clause Arguments
in the Lower Courts
Neither approach adopted by the lower courts in attempting to apply
the Supreme Court's holding in National League is satisfying. The
problem with the balancing approach followed by the district court in
Usery v. Dallas Independent School District21 1 was the fact that it was
ad hoc. Neither National League nor Dallas laid down guidelines by
which the balancing was to be carried out. An ad hoc balancing test
would leave the courts without any real formula by which to determine
the proper allocation of power in the federal system. This is not to say,
however, that a balancing approach with guidelines may not prove useful
in federalism cases generally, or that such an approach is not justified
by the National League opinion.21 2
The approach taken in Christensen v. Iowa213 - that the ability
of state and local- governments to discriminate as to wages among men
and women was not an attribute to sovereignty - is likewise unsatis-
factory, for this approach dodges the underlying issue addressed by
the Supreme Court in National League. While the specific issue be-
fore the Supreme Court was whether the wage and overtime provi-
sions of the FLSA could be extended to state and local governments,
the view of the Courf seems to have been that Congress could not, by
virtue of the commerce power, decide how these governments were to
structure integral services, including the payment of wages. Putting
aside for the moment the admittedly valid fourteenth amendment ground
"an employer who is paying a wage differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in
order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any
employee." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
2-08 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
29 421 F. Supp. at 116.
210 Id. at 116 n. 7.
211 421 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
212 Such a balancing test is suggested at the end of this Note. See section VI-B of the
text inf ra.
213 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976).
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for upholding the Equal Pay Act as applied to public employees, it is
difficult to see the difference on commerce clause grounds between
Congress telling public employers to begin paying equal wages regardless
of sex, and Congress telling such employers to begin paying a living
wage. Both are intrusions upon "the States freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional government functions. '" 21 4 Moreover,
if the purposes of the FLSA are to prevent labor unrest and the spread
of undesirable labor conditions which burden commerce, there would
seem to be no greater threat to commerce from the payment of dis-
criminatory wages than from the failure to pay a living wage.
While it is a plausible argument that greater injustice results from
the denial of equal pay for equal work on account of sex than the denial
of what Congress considers to be a minimum wage for low skill jobs,
this is essentially an equal protection question and has no real relevance
to the commerce power. Therefore, while the lower courts considering
the constitutional application of the Equal Pay Act and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act2 1 5 were undoubtedly correct on the
fourteenth amendment ground, the holding in National League did not,
contrary to their findings, provide an independent ground of decision
favoring application of the Acts to public employers.
D. Decisions Holding that Sex Discrimination Guidelines
Cannot Be Extended to Public Employers
As mentioned earlier in this Note, two district courts have held that
the Supreme Court's decision in National League precludes application
of the Equal Pay Act to state and local governments. Both courts,
however, appear to have given too broad a reading to the Supreme Court's
holding in National League.
In the first case, Howard v. Ward County,216 the court did not
address at length the possibility that the Equal Pay Act provisions of
the FLSA could be distinguished from the minimum wage and overtime
provisions at issue in National League. Since both portions of the Act
had been extended to state and local governments by the redefinition
of "employer" to include "public agencies," the district court summarily
ruled that the Equal Pay Act was inapplicable to public employers.2 17
The practical effect of this holding was minimal for the parties involved,
however, since the court upheld the plaintiff's companion claim brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.218
A more substantial discussion was given to the issue in Usery v.
Owensboro-Daviess County Hospital, 19 in which the plaintiff apparently
filed no claim under Title VII. Basically, the Owensboro court followed
214 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
215 Although this discussion has referred only to the Equal Pay Act, the same argu-
ments apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
21' 418 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.D. 1976).
217 Id. at 500-01.
21s Id. at 505.
219 423 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1976).
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the same line of reasoning adopted in Howard v. Ward County, and held
that publicly-run hospitals were no longer subject to any of the provisions
of the FLSA since in the district court's view the term "employer" no
longer included "public agencies" where any FLSA provision was in-
volved.220 The court rejected the defendant's argument that the sever-
ability provision of the FLSA should be used to allow the Equal Pay Act
to stand despite nullification of the minimum wage and overtime pro-
visions. Here the court reasoned without supporting authority that
"Congress obviously intended the equal pay provisions to be co-extensive
in coverage with the minimum wage provisions of the same Act.
'
"
22
'
Followed to its logical conclusion, the court's reasoning would negate
the purpose of the severability clause altogether. Although it could
safely be said that Congress intended the Equal Pay Act and the wage
and overtime provisions to be co-extensive at the time that it passed the
1974 amendments, there is no reason to assume that Congress either
foresaw or intended that the Supreme Court's nullification of the former
would result in the abrogation of the latter. This is especially true in
light of the language of the severability clause: "If any provision of this
chapter or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter and the application of
such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
thereby."2 22 Contrary to the Owensboro court's reasoning, the sever-
ability clause appears fully sufficient to allow the definition of "em-
ployer" to include public agencies in circumstances in which the Equal
Pay Act is involved, even though the Act is less inclusive in cases
involving the minimum wage and overtime provisions. The court's
further assertion that such a result would "lead to chaos"2 2 3 does not
seem justified. If the National League holding is applicable to the equal
pay cases, it is applicable only to the extent that public employees are
engaged in a state activity to which the holding applies, and the Equal
Pay Act cases would of necessity require a preliminary determination
whether the activity in question was integral and traditional.224  If a
non-integral, nontraditional activity is found to be involved, then the
Equal Pay Act, like the minimum wage and overtime provisions, would
clearly apply. This two-step determination is certainly no less chaotic
then placing all public employees clearly within the Equal Pay Act's
coverage.
The Owensboro court declined even to consider the plaintiff's argu-
ment that the Equal Pay Act, if not valid under the commerce clause,
could be held valid under the fourteenth amendment.22 5  Here the
court asserted that it could not uphold the Equal Pay Act under the
220 Id. at 845.
221 Id. at 846.
22- 29 U.S.C. § 219 (1970) (emphasis added). See notes 24-25 supra and accompany-
ing text.
223 423 F. Supp. at 846. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
224 Id. at 846-47.
225 Id.
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fourteenth amendment, since the Supreme Court refused to consider this
basis for the FLSA in National League.226  The district court seems
clearly to have misread National League on this point. The Supreme
Court in National League did expressly decline to address the extent to
which section five of the fourteenth amendment allows Congress to
infringe upon the sovereignty of the states.2 2 7 A decision on that issue
was simply not necessary in order to dispose of the case presented,
however, because the minimum wage and overtime provisions could only
be justified under the commerce clause, and no colorable argument
could be made for Congress' power to pass them pursuant to any other
section of the Constitution. In contrast, the Equal Pay Act cases present
some issues of equal protection considered in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
228
in which the Supreme Court upheld extension of Title VII to state and
local governments as a legitimate exercise of Congress' power under the
fourteenth amendment. Moreover, the fact that the preamble or legis-
lative history of a given statute indicates that it is based on Congress'
power under one section of the Constitution does not preclude it from
being upheld as an exercise of a different section not expressly men-
tioned. 2 '9 The Owensboro and Howard courts, therefore, seem clearly
to have been in error in holding that the Equal Pay Act could not be
applied to public employers in light of National League.
VI. A BALANCING APPROACH FOR CASES INVOLVING REGULATION
OF THE STATES QUA STATES UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
IN LIGHT OF NATIONAL LEAGUE
A. Why a Balancing Approach is Needed
The preceding analysis of the Equal Pay Act and Age Discrimination
in Employment Act cases indicates that while Congress has significant
power to regulate public employers in the equal protection area under
powers granted in the fourteenth amendment, its power is not so great
under the commerce clause and other article I provisions. Neverthe-
less, Justice Blackmun's concurrence in National League230 pointed out
the need for a balancing approach in federalism cases when the com-
merce clause, and not the fourteenth amendment, is involved. The
dissenters in National League might still argue that there is no balance
to strike as long as Congress acts within the scope of its delegated
powers,231 but it is clear from National League, United States v. Fry,
2 2
and Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfarern that the
226 Id. at 846.
227 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 n. 17 (1976).
22- 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
229 See note 189 supra.
230 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring).
231 See discussion of the necessary and proper clause in text accompanying notes 108-11
supra.
232 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
23 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
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states enjoy a special status when subjected to federal regulation under
the commerce power. While language in the majority opinion in Na-
tional League perhaps suggests that the states as states may never be
regulated under the commerce power, 2 4 the majority opinion does not
explicitly rule out such an approach. The fact that the majority chose
to distinguish Fry rather than to overrule it indicates that state activities
may be regulated under the commerce power in certain circumstances,
and the concept of a national government would seem to contain within
itself the idea that the interests of the states, even as to integral govern-
mental functions, must at times bow to a greater national interest. This
is not inconsistent with the idea of a special status for the states. An
overriding national interest may be found to exist in situations such as
those in Fry, Case v. Bowles,235 and Sanitary District,236 and in such
circumstances federal regulation of the states as states should be upheld.
It is obvious that a balancing approach, to be useful, must include
appropriate guidelines if the courts are not to become the sole arbiters in
the allocation of power between the national government and the
states. 37 The following section outlines a suggested approach to the
determination of federalism questions which would include the guidelines
implicit in the FLSA and other federalism decisions discussed above.
B. A Suggested Approach
This approach consists of three steps: 1) the determination of whether
an integral and traditional state function is involved; 2) the finding of a
clear statement by Congress; and 3) the determination of whether a sub-
stantial national interest is at stake.
The threshold question is whether an integral and traditional state
function is to be regulated. The National League opinion assumed
without explanation that "one undoubted attribute of state sovereignty
is the States' power to determine the wages to be paid to those whom
they employ in order to carry out their governmental functions." 23s
The Court's failure to explain the basis of this assumption is regrettable.
Nevertheless, those activities included with the rubric of undoubted
attributes of state sovereignty are not unknown. State-operated rail-
roads,239 mineral water production, 240 and liquor stores241 are clearly
234 "Congress may not exercise that power so as to force directly upon the States its
choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental
functions are to be made." 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976).
235 327 U.S. 92 (1946).
236 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
237 The absence of such guidelines was the problem with the ad hoc balancing approach
adopted by the district court in Usery v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 421 F. Supp.
111 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
23 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).
239 Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); United States v. California,
297 U.S. 175 (1936). State-owned railraods are explicitly excluded from the National
League holding, according to the district court's opinion on remand. See note 25 supra.
240 New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
241 Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S.
437 (1905).
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excluded. However, the Court's overruling of Wirtz indicates that state
activities are not excluded merely because they are simultaneously
provided by the private sector. The touchstones suggested by the Court
are that state activities must be "integral" - that is, necessary for the
state to carry out its role - and "traditional" - those integral activities
which citizens have come to expect their state governments to provide.
Some questions in the "grey area" of services provided simultaneously
by public and private bodies will undoubtedly have to be resolved by
litigation.2 42 It is also likely that the word traditional will be defined so
as not to include only those activities carried on by states for many
years, in order to protect state sovereignty over newer, but nonetheless
integral, services.2
43
Once it is determined that a regulation infringes upon an integral
and traditional state function, the question becomes whether Congress
has clearly stated its intent to regulate or interfere. If not, the Court is
likely to adopt the same approach as in the Employees case where it
merely assumed that Congress would not intend to re-arrange the
allocation of power within the federal system without clearly stating so.
There are cases such as Fry,2 44 however, in which a substantial national
need was clearly demonstrated. In such a case, congressional motiva-
tion might also be assumed.
The third step in attempting to strike a balance is to determine
whether a substantial national interest is at stake. The existence of such
an interest was clearly present in Fry, Case v. Bowles, and Sanitary
District where federal power to regulate the states was upheld. By
relinquishing certain powers such as the regulation of commerce to the
national government, the states have necessarily consented to their use by
that government whenever a serious problem with interstate conse-
quences can only be solved by that means. The special status of the
states which was recognized in National League, however, requires a
showing of greater need for exercise of the power to regulate a state
than would be necessary to regulate a private interest. Thus, it was clear
in Fry that if the states were not included in a general national wage
freeze, Congress would be unable to control the inflation then threaten-
242 National League of Cities v. Marshall, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6933, 6935 (D.D.C.
1977).
241 The need to accommodate changes over the passage of time in determining which
functions are "governmental" was noted by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion
in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 596 (1946). The problem is to avoid con-
sidering as governmental functions only those activities which governments may have
conducted at the time of the drafting of the Constitution, while not permitting states
to take advantage of their immunity from federal regulation by extending these im-
munities to nongovernmental fields. A partial solution was suggested by Justice Douglas
in his ,opinion for the Court in Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Public Health and Welfare,
411 U.S. 279, 284 (1973). There he pointed out that asylums, while not operated by
governments in 1789, were operated first by the public sector and not by the private
sector. Thus activities might qualify as traditionally governmental if they have since their
inception been conducted by the government, even though there are similar activities
conducted by the private sector. However, the activity would also have to be regarded
as "integral" in order to qualify.
244 See note 98 supra.
1977]
35Published by EngagedScholar hi @CSU, 1977
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
ing the economy and interstate commerce. In National League, how-
ever, there was no clear threat to commerce by the failure of the states
to pay minimum wages to 138,000 out of 6.3 million state and local
government employees, 245 and was no substantial need for the exercise
of the national power to regulate commerce.
This suggested approach helps to explain the different results in
National League and Fry, and overcomes the suggestions in National
League that certain integral and traditional governmental functions may
never be regulated, regardless of the national interest at stake. It pro-
tects the states' prerogatives by requiring a clear statement by Congress
and a demonstration of a substantial need for the exercise of a delegated
power. It allows the national government to act, however, when the
duties delegated to it in the Constitution dearly require some infringe-
ment upon state sovereignty.
VII. CONCLUSION
The history of the Fair Labor Standards Act provides a number of
insights into the scope of the national power to regulate commerce as
it affects the governmental activities of the states. National League of
Cities v. Usery in particular was a landmark case because it clearly
established that there are instances when Congress may not intrude upon
the sovereignty of the states, though acting within the scope of its power
to regulate private interests. Nevertheless, the majority opinion in that
case was confusing because it did not clearly explain its method of
reasoning, nor make sufficiently clear that the sovereignty right of the
states is less than absolute. Doubtlessly, problems will arise in the
future concerning the exact scope of the state governmental activities
which merit special insulation from the exercise by Congress of its
constitutionally-delegated powers. The Supreme Court will have to
adopt a clearer method for determining that a substantial national
interest is indeed present, and that state sovereignty must therefore be
overridden. The approach suggested in this Note hopefully provides a
step in that direction.
W. HARDING DRANE
245 See note 73 supra. The requirement that Congress demonstrate a substantial need
for the exercise of its power to regulate is not the same as demonstrating that state gov-
ernments have a substantial impact on commerce. Given the size of state and local
governments today it cannot be denied that their payrolls and purchases of goods and
services have such an impact. Nor is it enough for this purpose that the Court be able to
find a rational basis for a congressional finding that an activity has a substantial and
harmful effect on commerce. Although this would be sufficient to justify the regulation of
a private, local activity, Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258
(1964), National League clearly rejected this standard for regulation of the states qua
states. 426 U.S. 833, 840-41 (1976). The higher standard of requiring a showing of an
actual threat to commerce protects the power delegated to Congress by the-states, while
at the same time granting to the states ample "freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions." 426 U.S. at 852.
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